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6

7  
8 BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSIONER  
9 OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
10

11 JAMES MARK BURNETT, an  
individual; MARK BURNETT  
12 PRODUCTIONS, INC., a corporation;  
JMBP, INC., a corporation; DJB INC., a  
13 corporation; and JUMP IN, INC., A  
corporation,  
14

CASE NO. TAC 10192

**DETERMINATION OF  
CONTROVERSY**

15 Petitioners,

16 vs.

17  
18 CONGRAD RIGSS, an individual; and  
CLOUDBREAK ENTERTAINMENT,  
19 INC., A California corporation,  
20

Respondents.

21 The above-captioned matter, a Petition to Determine Controversy under Labor  
22 Code §1700.44, came on regularly for hearing in Los Angeles, California, before the  
23 undersigned attorney for the Labor Commissioner assigned to hear this case. Petitioners  
24 JAMES MARK BURNETT, an individual; MARK BURNETT PRODUCTIONS, INC., a  
25 corporation; JMBP, INC., a corporation; DJB INC., a corporation; and JUMP IN, INC., A  
26 corporation, appeared represented by Steven A. Marenberg, Harry A. Mittleman, and  
27 Juliet Youngblood of IRELL & MANELLA LLP. Respondents CONRAD RIGGS, an  
28

1 individual; and CLOUDBREAK ENTERTAINMENT, INC., A California corporation,  
2 were represented by Bart H. Williams, Esq., Sean Eskovitz, Esq., Susan R. Szabo and  
3 Soraya C. Kelly of Munger Tolles & Olson. At the conclusion of the hearing, the matter  
4 was taken under submission.

5 Based on the evidence presented at this hearing and on the other papers on file in  
6 this matter, the Labor Commissioner hereby adopts the following decision.

### 7 FINDINGS OF FACT

8 1. Petitioner Mark Burnett is a successful creator and producer of unscripted  
9 (“reality”) television series such as *Survivor*, *The Apprentice*, *The Restaurant*, and *The*  
10 *Contender*, to name a few. Burnett frequently conducts business through his wholly  
11 owned companies, Petitioners Mark Burnett Productions, Inc., JMBP, Inc., DJB, Inc. and  
12 Jump In, Inc., all California corporations. (Mark Burnett, Mark Burnett Productions, Inc.,  
13 JMBP, Inc., DJB, Inc. and Jump In, Inc., hereinafter, collectively referred to as  
14 “Burnett”).

15 2. From 1998 through 2007, Respondent Conrad Riggs, a licensed California  
16 Attorney, served as Burnett’s main business affairs negotiator. Respondent Cloudbreak,  
17 Inc. serves as Conrad Riggs’ loan-out company but has also operated as a talent and  
18 literary management company. (Conrad Riggs and Cloudbreak, Inc., hereinafter,  
19 collectively referred to as “Riggs”). At no time has Riggs been licensed as a talent agency  
20 with the Labor Commissioner.

21 3. Burnett and Riggs met in December 1997 through Riggs’ client,  
22 Director Zalman King, and began working together in early 1998. At the time, Burnett  
23 was producing a successful cable television series called *Eco-Challenge* through the  
24 Discovery Channel and was in negotiations with the Discovery Channel to sell *Eco*  
25 *Challenge*’s production and distribution company, Eco Challenges Lifestyles, Inc. With  
26 respect to this sale, Burnett and Riggs entered into an oral agreement for Burnett to pay  
27 Riggs 2.5% of the sale of Eco Challenges Lifestyles, Inc. in exchange for Riggs analyzing  
28 the financial, business and distribution aspects of the deal. Riggs testified that he advised

1 Burnett not to make this sale to the Discovery Channel because the sale would result in  
2 Burnett's producing services being "exclusive" to the Discovery Channel. Instead, Riggs  
3 thought that it would make more sense to enter into an agreement to sell only the licensing  
4 rights to broadcast *Eco Challenge* and have Eco Challenges Lifestyle, Inc. remain an  
5 independent production company. The deal with the Discovery Channel did not close and  
6 subsequently, Riggs negotiated a license agreement between Eco Challenges Lifestyles,  
7 Inc. and the USA Network which sought the license to broadcast *Eco Challenge* in the  
8 United States.

9 4. Not long after they began working together, Burnett told Riggs that he had  
10 acquired an option on the rights to an idea created by a British television producer named  
11 Charlie Persons. The rights to this idea, known as "*Survive*," were owned by a company  
12 partly owned by Mr. Parsons called Planet 24. The option Burnett had acquired was about  
13 to expire and Burnett needed an extension so that he could continue trying to sell the show  
14 *Survive* to a network. Accordingly, Burnett and Riggs entered into another oral  
15 agreement, the terms of which the parties now dispute.

16 5. According to Burnett, Riggs represented that he had many industry contacts  
17 and could help Burnett sell *Survive*, later known as *Survivor*, as well as other Burnett  
18 shows. Burnett testified that he agreed to pay Riggs 10% of whatever monies he made  
19 from this show in exchange for: (1) Riggs first negotiating an extension to the original  
20 option Burnett had previously negotiated with Mr. Parsons to license the American rights  
21 to the format of *Survive*; (2) setting up meetings for Burnett to pitch this show to the  
22 different networks; (3) negotiating a contract with a network; and thereafter, (4) servicing  
23 the deal. Burnett explained that he opted to pay 10% of his net earnings to Riggs rather  
24 than pay him an hourly fee for working on a deal that could potentially not close.

25 The parties operated under this oral agreement from 1998 to 2007 on the *Survivor*  
26 series and also on other series produced by Burnett such as *Eco Challenge*, *Combat*  
27 *Missions*, *The Apprentice*, *The Restaurant*, *The Casino*, *RockStar*, *Gold Rush*, *The*  
28 *Contender*, *Martha* and *On the Lot*. Burnett testified that his deal to pay Riggs 10% of his

1 net earnings was limited to shows that Riggs negotiated and serviced.

2 6. While Riggs agreed that he was entitled to 10% of Burnett's net earnings on  
3 shows he negotiated under the parties' oral agreement, Riggs testified that the parties also  
4 agreed they would do *all* reality television together. Furthermore, Riggs testified that his  
5 oral agreement with Burnett was modified in the summer or fall of 2005 when there was  
6 an offer to purchase Burnett's companies by a media company called CKX. According to  
7 Riggs, the new oral agreement provided that he would receive 10% from the sale of  
8 Burnett's companies, and like Burnett, he would be hired at a \$1 million dollar annual  
9 salary for a 6 year term by this new company. Under this new company, Burnett would  
10 be CEO and Riggs would be COO. Additionally, Riggs would be entitled to 2 ½ percent  
11 of the stock in the new company which reflects 10% of the 22 1/2 % stock Burnett would  
12 be entitled to under this purchase. Riggs testified that if the sale of Burnett's company  
13 closed, that he and Burnett agreed that Riggs would receive money even on shows where  
14 Riggs did not render any services.

15 7. The purchase deal with CKX, however, never closed and the parties  
16 continued to operate under the original oral agreement wherein Riggs received 10% of  
17 Burnett's net earnings on deals he negotiated and serviced with the exception of *The*  
18 *Apprentice* where Riggs received more than his customary 10% of Burnett's net earnings  
19 due to earnings the parties agreed he would receive on ancillary deals related to the show.  
20 Eventually the parties' relationship began to deteriorate and in July, 2008, Riggs filed suit  
21 against Burnett in the Superior Court claiming that Burnett orally agreed to make Riggs  
22 his "partner" and that Riggs owns a stake in Burnett's companies.

23 8. In response to this lawsuit, Burnett filed the instant petition to determine  
24 controversy alleging that Riggs violated the Talent Agencies Act ("Act") by unlawfully  
25 procuring and negotiating employment or engagements for Burnett to render executive  
26 producing services with third parties such as networks and independent production  
27 companies. Consequently, Burnett seeks to void his oral contract with Riggs under the  
28 Act. Burnett also seeks disgorgement, an accounting and requests that the Labor

1 Commissioner set up a constructive trust on all funds received by Riggs from third-parties  
2 that relate to improper and/or illegal services in violation of the Act. Lastly, Burnett seeks  
3 a declaratory judgment or other determination confirming that neither Riggs nor  
4 Cloudbreak has any ownership interest in any of Burnett's companies or any right to  
5 additional payment from Burnett or Burnett's companies.<sup>1</sup>

6 9. Riggs' defense to this petition is that the parties were creating a business  
7 empire under which they agreed to jointly create independent production companies that  
8 retained as many rights to Burnett's shows as possible, but could make the show within  
9 budget and thus, make a profit. Under this business model, the negotiations with  
10 networks and other third parties were for the purpose of licensing the rights to broadcast  
11 the shows in exchange for the networks financing the production. Thus, the independent  
12 production companies created by Burnett for each of the shows he produced were  
13 responsible for making the shows and hiring the employees. Riggs argues that under this  
14 business model, Mark Burnett was self employed by his various independent production  
15 companies. As such, Riggs argues that there is no violation of the Act where there is no  
16 procurement of third party employment or engagements. Riggs also argues, in the  
17 alternative, that the deals he negotiated for Burnett and his companies are exempt from the  
18 Act as packaging agreements.<sup>2</sup>

19 <sup>1</sup> Burnett also argues that the oral contract is void between the parties because Riggs was  
20 acting as Burnett's attorney and under California Rule of Professional Conduct, Rule 3-  
21 300, a written contract is required between a lawyer and a client. The determination of  
22 whether Riggs acted as Burnett's attorney is outside of the Labor Commissioner's  
23 jurisdiction. Likewise, whether Riggs is Burnett's "business partner" as a matter of law or  
24 part owner of Burnett's companies, is also outside of our jurisdiction. In *Blanks v. Riccio*,  
25 TAC 7163, we ruled that formation of a partnership does not exempt one from the  
26 licensing requirements of the Act, however, in that case, there was no dispute that a  
27 partnership was created between the parties. Here, Burnett disputes that he was ever  
28 Riggs' "partner." Accordingly, the partnership issue is left for the court to decide in the  
pending superior court action. Our review of this matter is limited to determining whether  
there has been a violation of the Talent Agencies Act by Riggs. That is, did Riggs  
unlawfully operate as an unlicensed talent agent under the Act.

<sup>2</sup> A "Packaging Agreement" is a business arrangement that involves "pitching" an idea and  
bundling the talent and production to sell to a third party in this "packaged" form. See  
*Hyperion Animation Co. v. Toltec Artist, Inc.*, TAC 7-99. We have held that the Labor  
Commissioner lacks jurisdiction under the Act to resolve disputes concerning packaging  
agreements. See October 30, 1998 Opinion Letter issued by then Labor Commissioner



1           Legislature intended such a radically far reaching result... [I]n  
2           order to qualify as an 'artist,' there must be some showing that  
3           producer's services are artistic or creative in nature, as  
4           opposed to services of an exclusively business or managerial  
5           nature.

6           *American First Run dba American First Run Studios, Max Keller, Micheline Keller v.*  
7           *OMNI Entertainment Group, A Corporation; Sheryl Hardy, Steven Maier, TAC 32-95.*

8           Applying this test, in *Burt Bluestein, aka Burton Ira Bluestein v. Production Arts*  
9           *Management; Gary Marsh; Steven Miley; Michael Wagner, ("Bluestein"), TAC 14-98,*  
10          we dismissed the petition because there was not a significant showing that the producer's  
11          services were creative in nature as opposed to services of an exclusively managerial or  
12          business nature. In reaching this conclusion, we explained that,

13                   [o]ccasionally assisting in shot location or stepping in as a  
14                   second director as described by petitioner, does not rise to the  
15                   creative level required of an 'artist' as intended by the drafters.  
16                   Virtually all line producers or production managers engage in  
17                   de minimum levels of creativity. There must be more than  
18                   incidental creative input. The individual must be primarily  
19                   engaged in or make a significant showing of a creative  
20                   contribution to the production to be afforded the protection of  
21                   the Act. We do not feel that budget management falls within  
22                   these parameters.

23           *Bluestein, supra*, at p. 6. See also, *Hyperion Animation Co., Inc. v. Toltect Artists, Inc.*,  
24           TAC 07-99.

25           Here, there can be no doubt that producer Mark Burnett is an "artist" within the  
26           meaning of the Act. Burnett testified that he took Charlie Parson's concept of putting a  
27           few people on an island and having a billionaire on a yacht offshore kick them off one by  
28           one and turned this idea into one of the most successful dramatic non-scripted shows of all  
29           time. Moreover, Burnett was described by *Survivor* Producer Jay Bienstock, former  
30           *Survivor* Producer Tom Shelly and Roy Bank who worked on the productions of *The*  
31           *Restaurant* and *The Casino*, as being a very active and "hands on" producer who had the

1 final say on creative decisions on all of his shows. On *Survivor*, Burnett was involved in  
2 casting, scouting locations, hiring the crew, talking with producers about marooning  
3 contestants, talking to producers about the theme of the show, creating the dramatic arc of  
4 the shows to assisting in editing hundreds of hours of raw footage to create a dramatic  
5 story. Likewise, on *The Restaurant*, Burnett laid out a creative vision for what the show  
6 should be that was described as “cohesive and complete” and from there, oversaw every  
7 step of the creative from casting to approval of the final creative story line. On *The*  
8 *Apprentice*, Burnett made the creative decision that Donald Trump’s boardroom should  
9 look like a Harvard law library without the books. Similarly, Burnett decided that Donald  
10 Trump should have two lieutenants who serve as the eyes and ears of Donald Trump and  
11 who observe the contestants on their various business tasks and then report back to  
12 Donald Trump. Thus, it is evident from the testimony provided at this hearing by Riggs,  
13 Burnett and third party witnesses, that Burnett’s success as a producer of reality television  
14 shows is greatly attributed to his creativity and vision as a producer and storyteller. As  
15 such, Burnett is an “artist” within the meaning of the Act.

16 **B. Riggs’ Negotiation of Licensing, Distribution and Financing Agreements with**  
17 **the Networks and an Internet Provider Does Not Violate the Act.**

18 Labor Code §1700.4(a) defines “talent agency” as “a person or corporation  
19 who engages in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure  
20 employment or engagements for an artist or artists, except that the activities of procuring,  
21 offering or promising to procure recording contracts for an artist or artists shall not of  
22 itself subject a person or corporation to regulation and licensing under this chapter.” “To  
23 ‘procure’ means ‘to get possession of: obtain, acquire, to cause to happen or be done:  
24 bring about.’” *Wachs v. Curry* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 616, 628. Labor Code §1700.5  
25 provides that “[n]o person shall engage in or carry on the occupation of a talent agency  
26 without first procuring a license...from the Labor Commissioner.”

27 ///

28 ///

1           **1. Burnett was Self Employed by his Own Independent Production**  
2           **Companies.**

3           It is undisputed that Riggs has never been licensed as a talent agency in the State of  
4 California. It is also undisputed that Riggs set up pitches and negotiated contracts with  
5 television networks in exchange for 10% of Burnett's earnings on the following shows:  
6 *Eco Challenge, Survivor, Combat Missions, The Apprentice, The Casino, The Contender,*  
7 *RockStar, and On the Lot* and an internet provider for *Gold Rush*. These agreements that  
8 Riggs negotiated, however, were licensing, distribution and financing deals negotiated  
9 between the networks (or, in the case of *Gold Rush*, an internet service provider) and a  
10 Mark Burnett Production company which was wholly owned by Mark Burnett and created  
11 specifically for each show Mark Burnett produced. They were not artist employment  
12 agreements with the networks, as Burnett now argues.

13           On *Survivor*, for instance, Burnett and Riggs structured the deal with the network,  
14 CBS, in a manner that would allow Mark Burnett, through his production company, to  
15 retain as many rights to the show as possible, including copyright and distribution rights.  
16 At the same time, the production company would be responsible for making the show and  
17 delivering it to the network. Thus, in this structure, a Mark Burnett entity known as DJB,  
18 Inc., entered into a joint venture with CBS Productions to form an independent financing  
19 and distribution entity which was also the copyright holder. This new company was  
20 known as Survivor Productions, LLC. Survivor Productions, LLC then formed a separate  
21 independent production company called Survivor Entertainment Group, Inc. which was  
22 responsible for hiring the staff and crew and was contractually required to hire Mark  
23 Burnett, Charlie Parsons and Conrad Riggs as producers.

24           We reject Burnett's argument that DJB, Inc. served only as his loan out company  
25 indicating that Burnett was not paid through his independent production company, and  
26 therefore his producing services were a work-for-hire with CBS. Instead, we recognize  
27 that DJB, Inc. is the licensor of the *Survivor* format rights and significantly, is CBS  
28 Production's partner in the joint venture that monetizes *Survivor* distribution and

1 merchandise rights, that is, the independent production company known as Survivor  
2 Productions, LLC.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, Burnett's producing services were not work-for-hire  
3 with CBS. Rather, his personal producing services were provided to his own independent  
4 production company.

5 On *The Apprentice*, Burnett formed an independent production company known as  
6 JMBP, Inc., the copyright holder. In exchange for a license fee from the network, NBC,  
7 JMBP, Inc. produced and delivered the show to NBC for broadcast. As in the case of  
8 *Survivor*, Burnett's independent production company, JMBP, Inc., retained all ancillary  
9 rights to monetize the show. JMBP, Inc. then created the independent production  
10 company wholly owned by Mark Burnett known as Archie Worldwide which was  
11 responsible for hiring the staff and crew to make the show.

12 The evidence presented establishes that this business model was followed in other  
13 shows made by Burnett such as *Eco Challenge*, *Combat Missions*, *The Casino*, *The*  
14 *Contender*, *RockStar*, *Gold Rush* and *On the Lot*. That is, Riggs negotiated corporate  
15 licensing and financing deals whereby the networks would pay one of Burnett's  
16 independent production companies a license fee in exchange for which the network would  
17 receive a limited license to a portion of the worldwide copyright in order to broadcast a

18 Burnett show in the United States for a certain term. Because the Burnett entity owned  
19 (or co-owned) the rights to the shows it produced, it expressly retained ownership and  
20 control over all rights that were not expressly licensed to the network.<sup>4</sup> Burnett, through  
21 his independent production companies, was responsible for hiring the production staff,  
22 physically producing the show, and supplying show episodes to the network in a format

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
24 <sup>3</sup> DJB, Inc. is also a party to the licensing, distribution and financing agreements with the  
USA Network on the show *Combat Missions*.

25 <sup>4</sup> Since Burnett, through his independent production companies, retained the intellectual  
26 property rights to his shows, he was able to generate millions of dollars through foreign  
27 licensing and distribution deals, music licensing deals, location agreements, and internet  
28 distribution arrangements. Burnett also generated enormous revenue from sponsorship  
and product integration deals with many Fortune 500 companies. (Product integration  
deals are a form of marketing and advertising in which a company's brand, product, or  
services are integrated into a television show.)

1 suitable for broadcast. Thus, while Burnett and his independent production companies  
2 were able to apply the network's license fee to finance the costs of production, including  
3 payment of staff, Burnett's independent production companies bore ultimate responsibility  
4 for overtures.

5 We have consistently held that the "activity of procuring employment under the  
6 Act refers to the role an agent plays when acting as an intermediary between the artist  
7 whom the agent represents and the *third-party employer* who seeks to engage the artists's  
8 services." *Chinn v. Tobin*, TAC 17-96 [Emphasis added]; See Also *Cham v.*  
9 *Spencer/Cowings Entertainment, LLC*, TAC 19-05; *Smith v. Chuck Harris*, TAC 53-05.  
10 Burnett described his companies as being "content" companies that independently  
11 produce their own shows from beginning to end and bear ultimate legal and financial  
12 responsibility for the series that the networks licensed. Thus, the evidence establishes that  
13 Burnett was self employed by his various production companies and not the networks, as  
14 he now argues. As such, there is no violation of the Act where, as here, there is no  
15 procurement of employment or engagements with a *third party employer* since Burnett is  
16 self employed by his own independent production companies. See also *American First*  
17 *Run v. Omni Entertainment Group*, TAC 32-95 where we held there is no violation of the  
18 Act where petitioners were self employed principals of an independent production  
19 company that produced its own content.

20 In reaching our holding in *American First Run, supra*, we found that respondents  
21 were not seeking employment with studios or production companies. Rather, respondents  
22 were looking for outside investors to invest in their production company so that they could  
23 produce a television series for which they already owned the production rights. We noted:

24 The purpose of respondents' efforts to locate "co-producers"  
25 was not to obtain "employment" for petitioners, but rather to  
26 obtain funds so as to allow a business enterprise and its  
27 executives to realize their goal of producing a television  
28 series. It is simply ludicrous to suggest that in order for  
respondents to engage in fund raising activities on behalf of a  
production company, they must be licensed as a talent agency

1 by the State Labor Commissioner.

2 See also *Rose v. Reilly*, TAC 43-97 where we found that the petitioner, a director, was  
3 already an employee of respondent's production company so no new employment was  
4 being sought or obtained for him *with a third party employer*.

5 Similarly, in *Chinn v. Tobin*, (TAC 17-96), ("*Chinn*") we held that there was no  
6 violation of the Act where there was no negotiation *with third party employers* for  
7 employment or entertainment engagements. Respondent was negotiating with third parties  
8 to distribute petitioner's music which respondent's production company owned. We  
9 noted:

10  
11 [Respondent's] role was analogous to an independent  
12 television production company that hires actors and other  
13 necessary employees for the production, that bears the  
14 expenses incurred in completing the production, that owns the  
15 movie or television series that it produces, and that has the  
16 right to enter into distribution agreements with networks for  
this movie or series. The Talent Agencies Act does not require  
that independent television producers be licensed to engage in  
such activities.

17 *Chinn*, at p. 11, fn.2.

18 Like *Chinn*, the independent production companies formed by Burnett for his  
19 various shows, were bona fide production companies which physically produced,  
20 controlled and bore ultimate financial and legal responsibility for the shows that the  
21 networks licensed. While Riggs did not own the various Burnett independent production  
22 companies or hired Burnett to work in such companies, as was in the case in *American*  
23 *First Run*, *Chinn* and *Rose*, *supra*, his negotiation with the networks was for the purpose  
24 of selling shows of which Burnett owned and controlled the rights. Thus, Burnett's  
25 argument that said cases are inapplicable ignores the fact that while Riggs may have been  
26 acting as an intermediary between Burnett and his independent production companies and  
27 the various networks, he was not negotiating for Burnett to be employed or engaged *by the*  
28

1 *networks* as an artist. The testimony and evidence presented establish that Mark Burnett  
2 was self employed *by his own companies* and not by the networks (or other third party  
3 production companies) and that Riggs served as an intermediary with the networks for the  
4 purpose of selling Burnett's shows and not for the purpose of obtaining employment for  
5 Burnett with the networks or other third party employers.

6 Notably, Burnett did not view Riggs as negotiating employment or engagements  
7 for him with the networks or other third parties. Rather, he testified that Riggs's role was  
8 to help him *sell* his shows to the various networks and then to get him the best deal to  
9 produce the shows:

10 Q: What would describe as the central purpose of your deal  
11 with Mr. Riggs?

12 A: Well, the central purpose was once I had *something to sell*,  
13 that he would set the meetings with the networks and actually  
14 make me the absolute – I mean to be honest with you, the  
15 absolute best deal he could make, the best producing deal he  
16 could make for me.

16 (Direct Examination of Mark Burnett by Steve Marenberg, R.T. 1348:20-1349 [Emphasis  
17 added]:1. See also R.T. 1413:8-16 where Burnett explains how he *sold* his show *The*

18 *Apprentice* to NBC, including the right to creatively produce the show.)<sup>5</sup> In this regard,  
19 we have held that “in looking at the entertainment industry as a whole, it is without  
20 exception the creator of the entertainment product is the employer. Whether film,  
21 television, stage, commercials or print modeling, the production company is invariably the  
22 employer.” *Miravalles v. Artists, Inc.* No. TAC 33-99, p. 10. There can be no doubt that  
23 Burnett individually and through his independent production companies was the creator of  
24 the various reality shows at issue herein. In fact, Burnett even states this in a deposition  
25 transcript from an unrelated lawsuit that was read into the record at this hearing relating to

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>5</sup>To be accurate, the testimony established that the terms “sell,” “sold” and “selling” are  
28 colloquial terms commonly used in this industry to describe the process of licensing rights  
to broadcast the tapes of the shows or use the format of the shows, to third parties for a  
period of time. That is, the shows are not being sold outright.

1 Riggs' compensation:

2 "Q (Attorney in Unrelated Case) Let me ask you about this  
3 statement 'What I make on shows, he gets 10 percent,' you  
4 said. When you said, 'What I make on shows,' are you talking  
5 about what you, and through your corporate entities, what you  
6 make?"

6 "A (By Burnett) No. What I make. Conrad's understanding  
7 with me, it's of what I make"

8 "Q And what do you mean by what I make?"

9 "A Well, **I'm physically creating and producing the shows.**  
10 As a result of that, I'm a specified earner on these shows, and  
11 Conrad would receive 10 percent of what I make."

12 [Emphasis added. R.T. 1373:4-20]. As the creator of the shows discussed herein, Burnett  
13 inevitably serves as the employer.

14 We find Burnett's reliance on *Brian Cummins and Scotsmanagement Corporation*  
15 *v. The Film Consortium*, (1983) TAC 5-83, ("*Cummins*"), misplaced. In *Cummings*, we  
16 held that the respondent violated the Act because he negotiated for employment for  
17 petitioner with third-party employers, the advertising agencies. Respondent argued that it  
18 was not in violation of the Act because it was a production company that employed  
19 petitioner. However, upon further review, we found that it was the advertising agencies  
20 who employed petitioner, not respondent's production company. The advertising  
21 agencies developed the advertising campaign, paid the entire cost of producing the  
22 commercials, and employed the production staff which produced the commercials.  
23 Respondent's production companies, on the other hand, neither exercised nor possessed  
24 control over petitioner's working conditions and performed very little or no actual  
25 production work. Burnett relies on *Cummins* to argue that Riggs violated the Act because  
26 his primary function was to act as an intermediary between networks and Burnett to  
27 arrange for networks to pay for Burnett's personal producing services. This argument,  
28 however, ignores the reality of the business transaction between Burnett's independent

1 production companies and the networks. As stated above, the evidence presented at the  
2 hearing does not establish that Riggs was negotiating for Burnett to be employed by the  
3 networks. Instead, the evidence establishes that Riggs was negotiating for the *sale of*  
4 *shows*, the rights of which are owned by Burnett, to networks for the networks to air the  
5 shows domestically, in exchange for a license fee that would fund the production of the  
6 series. This business reality leads us to conclude there is no violation of the Act in this  
7 case.

8           **2. “Producing fee,” “Services of the Essence,” and/or “Producing Credit**  
9           **Clauses in the Various Network Agreements do not Transmute the**  
10           **Networks into Burnett’s Employer.**

11           It is undisputed that Riggs negotiated licensing and distribution deals with  
12 networks and a third party internet provider which provided for Burnett to render future  
13 *personal producing services*. And, while many of the contracts Riggs negotiated included  
14 “producing fee,” “services of the essence,” and/or “producing credit provisions,” as Riggs  
15 correctly points out, an employment relationship is not created between Burnett and the  
16 networks by virtue of these rights and obligations. The evidence at the hearing establishes  
17 that “producing fees” that were set for Mark Burnett and others in the licensing and  
18 distribution agreements, were set to ensure that the money that was financed by the  
19 networks for the production of the show, actually went to the making of the show and was  
20 not all pocketed by Mark Burnett or other producers involved in making the shows.  
21 Likewise, the “service of the essence” provisions were set so that the key producers/  
22 players (e.g., Mark Burnett), actually produced the shows. The purpose of these clauses  
23 therefore, were for the production companies (which were wholly owned by Mark Burnett  
24 or owned in partnership with another production company) to actually hire Burnett to  
25 provide those services. Such clauses do not transmute the networks into Burnett’s  
26 employer.

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1     **C.     The Evidence Does Not Support a Finding that Riggs Violated the Act with**  
2           **Respect to *The Restaurant*.**

3           Burnett argues that Riggs also violated the Act when he negotiated with  
4 independent production company Reveille to hire Burnett to provide personal producing  
5 services that constituted a work-for-hire deal on the show *The Restaurant*. Unlike the  
6 other shows, Burnett did not own the intellectual property rights associated with *The*  
7 *Restaurant*.

8           The evidence, however, supports a finding that Burnett, and not Riggs, initially  
9 negotiated Burnett's work-for-hire agreement for *The Restaurant*, including his  
10 compensation. Riggs later converted the business agreement for this show from a work-  
11 for-hire to one that fit the business model of the other shows discussed in this decision,  
12 where through production and joint venture agreements, Burnett would co-own and  
13 physically produce the series and share in the proceeds. As such, as in the other  
14 production, licensing and financing agreements, there is not violation of the Act where  
15 Burnett is self employed by his own production company, even where it is through a joint  
16 venture with another independent production company such as Reveille.

17     **D.     Our Holding That The Act is Not Implicated on Licensing, Distribution and**  
18           **Financing Deals Negotiated by Riggs For Burnett's is in Accord with the**  
19           **Legislative Intent of the Act.**

20           Our holding that Riggs did not violate the Act in a situation where as here, he  
21 negotiated license, distribution and financing agreements with networks, an internet  
22 services provider and an independent production company (Reveille), which agreements  
23 included Burnett providing future personal producing services to his own, wholly owned  
24 independent production companies, is consistent with the legislative intent of the Act. As  
25 the courts have held, the Act "must be given a reasonable and common sense construction  
26 in accordance with the apparent purpose and intention of the lawmakers – one – that will  
27 lead to wise policy rather than mischief and absurdity." *Buchwald v. Superior Court*  
28 (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 347, 354-355. And as we stated in our decision in *American First*

1 *Run, supra*, we do not believe the Legislature intended to revolutionize the entertainment  
2 industry by requiring the licensing of all individuals engaged in raising funds, and in this  
3 case, negotiating licensing and distribution deals for bona fide independent production  
4 companies wholly owned by petitioner, or to dramatically expand the role of the Labor  
5 Commissioner to function as the arbiter of all business disputes that might arise in the  
6 course of such deals.<sup>6</sup>

7 **E. Riggs Unlawfully Procured Employment for Burnett on the Show *Martha*.**

8 Riggs admitted that he procured employment for JMBP Inc. for the services of  
9 Mark Burnett to render personal production services to Martha Stewart's company Martha  
10 Stewart Omnimedia. Unlike the licensing, distribution and financing deals made on the  
11 other shows discussed in this determination, the *Martha* show was a work-for-hire deal.  
12 There were no co-ownership rights to the show as there were with the other shows  
13 licensed to the networks. As such, when Riggs negotiated this agreement, he was doing it  
14 with a third party employer, Martha Stewart Omnimedia, in violation of the Act.

15 Riggs argues that even if he procured this work-for-hire employment for Burnett,  
16 Burnett failed to provide any evidence at the hearing that he provided "artistic" services  
17 on this employment/engagement. We reject this argument. We have ruled today that  
18 Burnett is an "artist" under the Act. There is no reason to doubt that he did not provide  
19 the same type of artistic services on this show that he provided on every other show he  
20 produced which is at issue in this case. As such, based on the totality of the evidence  
21 presented, we find that Burnett must have been creatively producing this engagement for  
22 third party production company Martha Stewart Omnimedia. Accordingly, Riggs violated  
23 the Act in negotiating this deal without first having obtained a talent agency license from  
24 the Labor Commissioner.

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27 <sup>6</sup> Since we do not find that Riggs acted as a talent agent when negotiating licensing,  
28 distribution and financing deals with the networks, an internet provider (*Gold Rush*) and  
an independent production company (Reville for *The Restaurant*), there is no need for us  
to determine the issue of whether Riggs was negotiating "package deals."

1 **F. Severability under *Marathon Entertainment v. Blasi*.**

2 In past decisions we have voided entire agreements between the parties for a single  
3 violation of the Act. And, in *Marathon Entertainment, Inc. v. Blasi* (2008) 42 Cal.4<sup>th</sup>  
4 974, 991, the California Supreme Court recognized that the Labor Commissioner may  
5 invalidate an entire contract when the Act is violated. The court, however, left it to the  
6 discretion of the Labor Commissioner to apply the doctrine of severability to preserve and  
7 enforce the lawful portions of the parties' contract where the facts so warrant. As the  
8 Supreme Court explained in *Marathon*:

9 "Courts are to look to the various purposes of the contract. If  
10 the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality,  
11 then the contract as a whole cannot be enforced. If the  
12 illegality is collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and  
13 the illegal provision can be extirpated from the contract by  
14 means of severance or restriction, then such severance and  
15 restriction are appropriate." [Citations omitted].

16 *Marathon, supra* at p.996.

17 Since the *Martha* agreement is the only agreement where we find that Riggs  
18 violated the Act, there is no question that severance is appropriate under *Marathon*.

19 Accordingly, we find that Riggs is not entitled to any further commissions, payments or  
20 monies associated with the *Martha* show. Additionally, Riggs is ordered to disgorge any  
21 commissions or monies he received from this show during the one year period preceding  
22 the filing of this petition on July 31, 2008.

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ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, we find that the parties' oral agreement is not subject to the provisions of the Talent Agencies Act on the following shows: *Survivor, Eco-Challenge, Combat Missions, The Apprentice, The Restaurant, The Casino, RockStar, Gold Rush, The Contender, and On the Lot.* With regard to the *Martha* show, we do find a violation of the Act and accordingly sever that agreement, pertaining to that show, from the remainder of the parties' oral contract. Additionally, we hereby declare that Riggs has no rights to any monies that have been paid or may be paid in connection with the *Martha* show. Riggs is also ordered to disgorge any monies he collected from Burnett with regard to the *Martha* show during the one year period prior to Burnett filing this petition, that is, from July 31, 2007 to July 31, 2008.

DATED: May 10, 2011

Respectfully submitted,

By: *Edna Garcia Earley*  
EDNA GARCIA EARLEY  
Attorneys for the Labor Commissioner

ADOPTED AS THE DETERMINATION OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER

Dated: May 10, 2011

By: *Julie A. Su*  
JULIE A. SU  
California Labor Commissioner



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